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## Africa Review

23 March 1979

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AFRICA REVIEW (U)

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Rhodesia: Muzorewa's Plans (U)

Bishop Abel Muzorewa, whose party is likely to win a majority of the parliamentary seats in the April national election, is already seeking ways to strengthen the future government. He has entered into a dialogue with the white Rhodesian leadership and is exploring the possibility of a broader Rhodesian settlement that would include some of the guerrillas. Although Muzorewa will probably emerge from the election as the most powerful internal black leader and the probable choice for Prime Minister, he has always sought to place himself above partisan politics and may seek a less prominent position in the new government. (S NF NC OC)

The whites apparently want to take the lead in determining the pace the black-led government will take in dealing with racial matters. In early February, leaders of Prime Minister Smith's Rhodesian Front Party presented Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC) with a document calling for greater cooperation between their parties, the gradual elimination of racially based parties, and the eventual deletion of clauses in the new constitution most objectionable to blacks. The document was drafted by Deputy Prime Minister David Smith and was said to reflect the views of the entire party leadership. (S NF NC OC)

Muzorewa was impressed that such an initiative was made well before the election and, in return, decided that his party would not attempt to recruit whites to run as UANC candidates against the Rhodesian Front for election to parliament. The UANC earlier had asked several prominent whites as well as some leaders of the small white liberal party to contest the white seats under Muzorewa's banner. The party plans instead to encourage these individuals to run as independents. (S NF NC OC)

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The Bishop realizes he will need white support for his government and wants to meet again soon with Rhodesian Front leaders to discuss possible ministerial appointments, plan future government policies, and map a joint strategy for obtaining international recognition for the new government. Muzorewa is considering naming a cabinet of 15 to 20 ministers that would include five of the more moderate white leaders now in the government. He would offer them portfolios in foreign affairs, finance, internal affairs, justice, and education. (S NF NC OC)

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[REDACTED] the Bishop has become increasingly concerned that personal and tribal loyalties are supplanting the role of political parties inside the country. Muzorewa believes that tribal splits within the country are becoming more rigid. As a result, Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union has become increasingly associated with the Ndebele ethnic group and Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) with the Shonas--who make up about 75 percent of the black population. Mugabe's reputation within Rhodesia has improved considerably in the past six months, and many Rhodesian blacks now regard him as the eventual leader of a black-ruled Zimbabwe. This has led many of Muzorewa's supporters to conclude that a Shona coalition uniting Mugabe and Muzorewa would be mutually beneficial and perhaps even inevitable. (S NF NC OC)

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Muzorewa may believe that the emergence of a black-led government in Rhodesia will open up new possibilities for a settlement with the guerrillas. UANC and ZANU officials have been in contact with each other for several months. In late February, a specific effort was made to arrange a meeting with ZANU leaders to discuss a possible alliance and to ask ZANU not to disrupt the election. ZANU so far has rejected all of Muzorewa's approaches, insisting that it would agree to sit down with Muzorewa only as part of a constitutional conference convoked by the United Kingdom. Some senior ZANU officials have indicated, however, that they would not rule out talks at some future date--particularly if Muzorewa withdrew from the internal settlement. (S NF NC OC)

Some of Muzorewa's supporters claim that he is considering disassociating himself from the internal settlement and returning to religious life if the April election

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fails to bring international recognition and if the fighting intensifies. Moreover, they believe he might subsequently announce support for Mugabe if he steps down. If the Bishop withdrew from politics, most of his supporters probably would switch their allegiance to Mugabe rather than to someone else in the UANC even if Muzorewa did not publicly come out in support of Mugabe. (S NF NC OC)

The Bishop is unlikely to leave politics soon, however, given the enormous pressures that would be brought on him by his party and others to stay in office and the personal commitment he feels to guide the country toward black rule. Nevertheless, the Bishop would like to avoid the intense political infighting certain to surround the Prime Minister's office, and he might seek a less demanding position such as the presidency. (S)  
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Rhodesia: Military Preparations for Election (S NF)

Rhodesia is attempting to thwart guerrilla efforts to disrupt the national election next month. The Rhodesians intend to initiate cross-border raids on guerrilla facilities in nearby countries; raise additional auxiliary forces to defend the tribal trust lands; take steps to put all available military and police manpower on active duty during the election period; and prepare plans for the defense of the polling places. These efforts will probably enable the Rhodesians to forestall significant disruption and intimidation by the guerrillas. (S NF NC OC)

Cross-Border Raids

The security forces are conducting a vigorous campaign of cross-border raids to strike at most guerrilla concentrations. As the election approaches, the security forces probably will intensify raids on guerrilla facilities in Zambia, Mozambique, and possibly Angola and Tanzania. (S NF NC OC)

By forcing the guerrillas to relocate their camps, command centers, and supply structures farther from the border, the Rhodesians are trying to lengthen guerrilla communication links and supply lines. This would decrease the ability of the guerrilla leaders to issue timely commands and would weaken their control over units inside Rhodesia. It would also delay or reduce logistical support for guerrillas in the field, forcing them to be more dependent on local sources, which would make them easier targets for the security forces. The Rhodesians hope that poor logistical support and reduced control may induce more guerrillas to defect to the interim government. (S NF NC OC)

The Rhodesian cross-border operations have been successful, forcing the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) to relocate many of its facilities in Mozambique away from the Rhodesian border. Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe

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African People's Union (ZAPU) is also relocating most of its holding and training camps deeper into Zambia.  
(S NF NC OC)

### Auxiliary Forces

The Rhodesians are augmenting and improving their control over the auxiliary forces--mostly exguerrillas who have defected to the interim government under the amnesty program initiated last April. They will be used to protect polling places in the rural tribal trust lands--where the majority of the black population lives. Their role is being expanded so that they may become the dominant internal security force after the election. (S NF NC OC)

The Rhodesians plan to raise additional troops so that there will be around 10,000 auxiliaries by the end of March. By the end of February, they contained about 9,000 personnel. The Rhodesians are recruiting local black volunteers to supplement the exguerrillas. New recruits are only receiving training in the use of Communist small arms, which have been captured from the guerrillas. The typical auxiliary unit consists of 10 to 20 men drawn from the surrounding area. Some units have been combined to form 200- to 250-man independent companies. (S NF NC OC)

The Rhodesians are now assuming direct control over the auxiliary forces. Black policemen and regular troops are being sent into the tribal trust lands to raise, train, and control the auxiliaries. Black officers are being placed in command of several small units in an assigned area and are responsible for providing logistical support. Liaison personnel do not actually lead the units or participate in operations, but are equipped with radios to call in air or ground support if the need arises. (S NF NC OC)

Auxiliary units currently are assigned responsibility for denying the guerrillas use of a specific area. The tribal trust lands turned over to the auxiliaries are treated as "frozen areas" by the security forces, who do not enter the region unless called in by the liaison officer. (S NF NC OC)

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Thus far, the auxiliaries have turned in a mixed performance. Some areas have been effectively denied to the guerrillas while auxiliaries have withdrawn from others after being defeated by the insurgents. Special ZANU "killer teams" have been sent into Rhodesia to eliminate the auxiliaries. [REDACTED] however, have indicated an increasing number of engagements by the auxiliaries, most of which have resulted in guerrilla casualties. (S NF NC OC)

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The Rhodesians have noted a number of problems with the auxiliaries. Coordination with the security forces is poor but is being improved. New recruits are poorly trained and often fare badly in clashes. Some auxiliary units have attacked white farms, but these have been eliminated quickly by the security forces. Moreover, some auxiliaries have been attempting to force political support for their political organization by intimidating and assaulting rural blacks. Some Rhodesian officials are concerned that the auxiliaries who still maintain political allegiance to the black coleaders in the transitional government may eventually develop into private armies should an armed confrontation between the internal nationalist groups occur. (S NF NC OC)

#### Security Forces Manpower

The Rhodesians are taking steps to put all available security forces and police manpower on active duty during the election period. Leave for all regular military personnel has been canceled; deferments and exemptions, which had allowed many white Rhodesians to escape military service, are being made harder to acquire; and reservists between 50 and 59 years of age are being mobilized to perform guard duty in urban areas. Martial law has been extended to over 90 percent of the country to give the security forces a freer hand prior to the election. Martial law restrictions, however, will be lifted during the election to help make it more acceptable to the outside world. (S NF NC OC)

Prior to the election, the Rhodesians plan to deploy about 10,000 primarily black military and police personnel--as well as the auxiliaries--to protect voters and polling places in rural areas. Regular and reserve

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white units and special forces may be held in reserve in the event of a major guerrilla incursion during the election. (S NF NC OC)

Current Rhodesian plans call for moving the polls from area to area over a five-day period beginning 17 April. This will enable the government to saturate limited areas with security forces, police, and auxiliaries and to help prevent guerrilla incidents and intimidation. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Nigeria: Potential Transition Hurdles (U)

Potential hurdles to a successful transition to civilian rule scheduled for next October have come into somewhat sharper focus in recent weeks as a result of student unrest in northern Nigeria and increasingly intense political campaigning in the west. Recent events suggest that the activities of two political parties not expected to come out on top--the People's Redemption Party and the Unity Party--may be the greatest test of the military government's ability to achieve a successful return to civilian rule. The US Embassy still believes that constitutional government will be restored as planned in view of the regime's apparent determination to contain the political situation and to have a peaceful changeover. Nevertheless, the US Embassy cautions that the process could yet be aborted if serious and widespread political violence erupts. (C)

The People's Redemption Party--Opting for a Spoiler's Role?

The real objective of Aminu Kano's People's Redemption Party--the smallest of Nigeria's five legally recognized parties and the least likely to win the civilian presidency--is an enigma. Opponents tend to ascribe a variety of sinister motives to this poorly understood group, which allegedly receives funds from Libya and clearly is confrontation-prone. There are indications that the People's Redemption Party may be bent on playing a spoiling role in the current political campaign, although what its leadership may hope to gain from such tactics is unclear. The unknown question is how far the group may be prepared to go to disrupt the situation.

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the party will try to disrupt presidential elections later this year. [redacted] also expressed the opinion that whoever wins would be killed. The assassination of any political leader, of course, could spark serious tribal violence. (S NF NC OC)

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The People's Redemption Party is a maverick group of northern Muslims based in Kano state who have a generally reformist and xenophobic outlook. It is the main regional antagonist of the far more conservative Muslim-oriented National Party, which represents the traditional northern establishment and is most likely to dominate Nigeria's future civilian government. Several large-scale confrontations occurred in Kano city last January between the People's Redemption Party and the rival National Party in the worst outbreak of political violence thus far. Some People's Redemption Party figures were arrested in the first such action since the ban on political activity was lifted last September, and the party is being closely monitored by security officials. Nevertheless, the People's Redemption Party still seems to display a quite cavalier attitude toward confrontation and violence. (C)

Several US Embassy sources allege that Aminu Kano and his People's Redemption Party have had a part in stirring up student problems in the north. Several weeks of student unrest over an education issue--highlighted by a northern newspaper--have underscored disparities between the underdeveloped Muslim north and the more advanced south, which has resulted in the closure of all northern universities and several colleges. Further disturbances are possible, which could stir wider regional and political tensions in Nigeria. (C)

#### The Unity Party--Can Chief Awolowo Accept Defeat?

Some government authorities are concerned that events in western Nigeria--inhabited by the large Yoruba ethnic group--may be shaping up as a greater threat to the successful conduct of elections than the People's Redemption Party poses in the north. The battle for the vote of the factionalized Yoruba west traditionally has been one of the most intensely fought political conflicts in Nigeria. Political violence in the west was primarily responsible for the breakdown of law and order there in 1963-65 during the first republic, which helped set the country on the road toward civil war and military rule. (C)

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An increasingly bitter campaign with scattered instances of violence is emerging in the west between Yoruba politicians allied with the front-running, northern-based National Party and those who are solidly behind Chief Awolowo's Unity Party, which appears to be the country's second ranking party. The 69-year-old Awolowo seems destined to lose the presidential contest because his party--even though it is Nigeria's best organized and disciplined party--appears to lack significant support among other ethnic groups and probably cannot hope to win more than 50-75 percent of the Yoruba vote. (C)

Some Nigerian observers are troubled by the combination of Awolowo's burning ambition to be president, a goal that has eluded the veteran politician since Nigerian independence in 1960, and his public reputation for vindictiveness and being a bad loser. These traits have fueled speculation that Awolowo--rather than accept defeat at the hands of his rivals--might unleash party thugs to incite street violence in hopes of forcing the military to stay in power. Other observers predict Awolowo would behave far more prudently--particularly under the watchful eyes of the military--and be satisfied if his party wins a healthy share of gubernatorial posts and federal legislative seats. (S NF NC OC) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Djibouti: Threats to Stability Remain (U)

President Gouled's heavyhanded establishment last month of a mass political party--intended to absorb all existing Djibouti political groups--has triggered dissatisfaction among his fellow Issas as well as among the Afars, the country's other major ethnic group. Afar resentment over the creation of the party may have been the reason for the raid on 10 March on a Djiboutian Army camp by radical Afar exiles trained in Ethiopia. The government moved quickly against those suspected of involvement in the attack, but dissident Afars reportedly plan to continue armed attacks in the future. Such activity could easily precipitate another crisis for the shaky government. (S NF)

The organizational meeting of the party--the Peoples Progress Assembly (RPP)--was tightly controlled by Gouled. Several prominent Afar politicians were absent as were other officials whose support would be essential in order for a single mass party to succeed in Djibouti. The limited Afar representation on the RPP's Central Committee seriously undermines the party's claims to national status; the capabilities of some of the Afars appointed to the party hierarchy have also been questioned. In addition, the RPP is generally considered to be the creation of Moumin Bahdon, an Issa, one of the most powerful politicians in Djibouti, and believed by some to have been selected by Gouled as his successor. Bahdon won the enmity of most Afars for his role, while Minister of the Interior, in the heavyhanded investigation of the Afars after a bombing incident in December 1977. (C)

Issa dissatisfaction with the party results from the dictatorial manner in which it was organized. The Issas are also unhappy that the Central Committee is dominated by Issas who are part of President Gouled's faction, unquestioning followers of Gouled and Gahdon, and nonentities. The dissatisfaction of the Issas, coupled with that of the Afars, will do little to foster the unity for which the RPP is intended and may well have the opposite effect. (C)

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If the formation of the RPP was not the primary cause of the 10 March dissident raid, it was at least responsible for the willingness of the local Afars to cooperate with the exile terrorists. 25X1C

25X1C [REDACTED] indicates the dissidents have plans for a number of additional operations, including terrorist attacks in urban areas. The quick response of Djiboutian security officials and the arrests of a number of suspected Afar collaborators, however, may put the damper on similar attacks for the moment. (S NF NC OC)

It appears that Ethiopia, which along with neighboring Somalia has designs on Djibouti, played a role in the March attack. It is not clear why Addis Ababa would want to stir up trouble at this time, but several reasons seem plausible. The attack may have been designed to allow Afar radicals training in Ethiopia to "let off steam." Some of these Afars have been in Ethiopian training camps since last year and pressure for action has probably been building. A number of the radicals have reportedly returned to Djibouti because of Ethiopia's failure to use them for the purposes they were recruited. Ethiopia may also have intended the raid as a warning to the Djiboutian Government--and perhaps Somalia--that Addis Ababa still is capable of causing problems. The effort in this case would be designed to point out to Gouled that he should continue to be cautious and not attempt to deviate from Djibouti's path of neutrality in the Horn. (S NF) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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Indian Ocean Islands: Reactions to an Increased  
US Military Presence (U)

Seychellois President Rene's brief but cordial letter of 9 March to President Carter, in which Rene expressed his concern over the possibility of the United States basing a new naval force at Diego Garcia, is primarily an attempt to ensure that the views of the Indian Ocean islands are taken into account in the formulation of US policy toward the area. The letter also underscores Rene's belief that an increased US presence will endanger the concept of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP) and encourage superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean. (S NF)

Rene has already received encouragement from Malagasy President Ratsiraka for his letter to Carter, and the opposition party in Mauritius, the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), also concurs in Rene's initiative. (S NF)

Rene's Options

Despite pressures from radical Arab and African states to close the US tracking station in the Seychelles,\* Rene is reluctant to do so. The station provides an important source of revenue for the financially pressed Seychellois. Although Rene is fully aware of the station's activities, he has maintained publicly that it does not have a military function and that he will demand that the United States close the station if he finds that it does. This posture allows the Seychelles to reap the economic benefits of the station while keeping the option of expelling station personnel if and when it is diplomatically advantageous for Rene to "discover" the military functions of the station. (S NF)


Another option open to Rene is the closure of Victoria to all US naval visits. US ships stop several

\*Madagascar closed a US tracking station in July 1975 and has encouraged Rene to do the same. (S NF)

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times a year in Victoria, and P-3 maritime reconnaissance aircraft from Diego Garcia land once a month in the Seychelles. The proximity of Diego Garcia undercuts any drastic effect of restrictions on the United States, although Rene probably believes the potential loss of Victoria, combined with the loss of several Iranian facilities, gives him greater leverage in US policy toward the area. (S NF)

None of the other Indian Ocean islands would support Rene in a similar gesture of protest. Mauritius and the Comoros Islands, economically dependent and politically oriented toward the West, are unlikely to restrict US visits. (S NF)

In order to discourage a US military buildup in the Indian Ocean, Rene probably intends to upbraid Washington in July at the UN Meeting of Littoral and Hinterland States on the Indian Ocean in New York. Over 40 countries will assemble to discuss the superpower presence in the ocean, and the United States will almost certainly be subjected to harsh criticism. The developing nations' suspicions, which have been increased by what the less developed countries perceive as US refusal to resume the US-Soviet negotiations on the Indian Ocean, will be heightened in the wake of reports that the US plans to station a larger force on Diego Garcia. The deployment of the US Constellation to the Arabian Sea has added to the suspicions of the developing nations. (S NF)

The public nature of Rene's letter to Carter--it was printed in the Seychelles' newspaper Nation--tends to back the idea that Rene hopes to exploit developing nation rhetorical support for his concerns before actually taking steps to alter his relationship with the United States. The UN meeting probably will, in Rene's eyes, underscore the international significance of his protest. Rene also probably believes that his rhetorical campaign at the UN meeting will enhance his popularity at home. (S NF)

Rene will probably also criticize the United States at the second meeting of the Indian Ocean Progressive Parties, which will be held in Madagascar in July.

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Attendants at last year's meeting\* demanded that the United States dismantle its facilities on Diego Garcia, requested that they be permitted to participate in the US-Soviet bilateral meetings on the Indian Ocean, and called for reduction of all fleets in the area. (S NF)

### Indian Ocean Islands' Viewpoints

The Indian Ocean islands have long been concerned about the activities of Soviet and Western naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The island governments have been particularly irritated because they believe the superpowers have ignored their views. (S NF)

The concept of an IOZP, long a cornerstone of Rene's political party, has become the most important objective of his foreign policy. The Seychellois President, who earlier encouraged the US-Soviet bilateral negotiations, is probably disillusioned because they have not resumed. At this point he probably still wants to maintain cordial relations with the United States. Nonetheless, he may be moving toward agreement with Madagascar's left-leaning President Ratsiraka, who believes that the superpowers consider the Indian Ocean states pawns that are expected to endorse the superpowers' final agreement on the Indian Ocean without participating in the negotiations. (S NF)

Ratsiraka, who has been the island community's most vocal advocate of the IOZP, responded last Tuesday to Rene's letter to President Carter in a Malagasy newspaper article entitled, "Identity of Viewpoints between Victoria and Antananarivo." Unlike Rene, who spoke kindly of President Carter and the "good relations" between the United States and the people of the Indian Ocean states, Ratsiraka's response is a direct condemnation of the US naval force. It also includes assurance of Malagasy support for Rene's initiative. (S NF)

Ratsiraka's ability to discourage a US buildup is limited. He is unlikely to play his trump card--granting base rights at Deigo Suarez to the Soviets--because of his deep-rooted suspicions of Moscow and his commitment to nonalignment. (S NF)

\*Participants included officials of the Seychellois and Malagasy Governments, representatives from the Mauritian opposition party, the MMM, and observers from several African liberation movements.

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Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam is unlikely to support Rene beyond the UN and Progressive Party meetings this July. Even though Ramgoolam concluded an agreement with the United Kingdom before independence separating Diego Garcia from Mauritius--a political issue constantly exploited by the opposition MMM--the Labor Party government is relatively secure at the moment. (S NF)

Comorian President Ahmed Abdallah may join Rene and Ratsiraka in expressing concern over a US buildup in the hope of repairing relations with Madagascar. Ratsiraka still regards Abdallah as an illegitimate ruler because he came to power through a white mercenary coup, and Madagascar has refused to reopen flights between the two capitals. The Comoros may also hope to improve relations with members of the Organization of African Unity, the majority of which have protested against Washington's facilities on Diego Garcia. Nonetheless, the Comorians, like the Mauritians, are unlikely to express their displeasure over an increased US military presence outside of the two meetings in July. (S NF) (SECRET NOFORN)

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RHODESIA: AN ANNOTATED CHRONOLOGY (U)  
(1-15 March 1979)

- 1 March Rhodesian aircraft attack a ZANU base in Mutarara, Mozambique, about 190 kilometers from the Rhodesian border. No casualties are reported. (U)
- 2-4 March ZANU leader Mugabe visits Ethiopia and meets with the chairman of the ruling council's foreign affairs committee who assures Mugabe of continued support and assistance to the liberation movements. (U)
- 2 and 5 March The UN Security Council meets to consider the Rhodesian situation. Representatives of the Patriotic Front, Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Gabon, Ethiopia, Portugal, and Cuba condemn the national election to be held in April and the Rhodesian attacks on neighboring states, and call for the strengthening of sanctions. (U)
- 3-4 March Angolan President Neto invites the frontline presidents to Luanda to discuss the situation in Namibia and Rhodesia. All attend, except Tanzanian President Nyerere, and they issue a communique denouncing the April election and condemning acts of Rhodesian aggression. SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and representatives of the Patriotic Front also attend. (U)
- 5 March Reverend Sithole announces his party's candidates--including nine women--for the 72 black parliamentary seats to be

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filled in April. Dr. Elliot Gabellah is excluded from the list and he withdraws from the party. He also agrees to resign his post as Cominister for Foreign Affairs in the transitional government. (U)

6 March

The Executive Council appoints Lt. Col. H. B. Everard as Acting President vice J. W. Pithey, who has served in that capacity since last November. (U)

Rhodesian Army Commander Lt. Gen. John Hickman is dismissed for improper conduct in his personal and professional life. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Hickman was also discovered to be tapping the telephone of the commander of the Selous Scouts Col. Ron Reid-Daley. (S NF)

8 March

The Rhodesian Government appoints Maj. Gen. Andrew "Sandy" MacLean as Army Commander vice Lt. Gen. John Hickman, promoting him to Lieutenant General. MacLean is highly regarded as a soldier's soldier. (U)

12 March

Rhodesian aircraft strike several times inside Mozambique, attacking the ZANU headquarters in Barragem but missing an arms depot in Chokwe, both about 160 kilometers north of Maputo. They return several days later and destroy the arms depot. (U)

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ZAPU leader Nkomo tells [REDACTED] that any observers sent by the United States or the United Kingdom to monitor the Rhodesian election in April will be targets for ZAPU and ZANU, in part because it would be impossible to distinguish between them and Rhodesian officials. (S NF NC OC)

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- 13 March           The Rhodesian Front Party announces its list of candidates for the white seats in the new parliament, including Prime Minister Ian Smith and the seven white cabinet coministers. The RF candidates are currently unopposed. (U)
- 14 March           Rhodesian Security Forces place the industrial area of Salisbury under a 1900 to 0500 curfew. The industrial area covers about eight square kilometers of the city and includes the city's power station and oil depot. (U)
- 15 March           Dr. Elliot Gabellah meets with ZAPU leader Nkomo in Nairobi on or near this date to discuss electoral strategy for the Ndebele ethnic group. Nkomo rejects Gabellah's proposal that Ndebeles should vote in a block for Chief Ndiweni's party to represent them in Parliament, arguing instead for a total Ndebele boycott of the election. (S NF NC OC)
- ZAPU leader Nkomo arrives in Lagos, his first stop on an intended tour of West African countries including possible stops in Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Guinea. (S NF) (SECRET NOFORN-NOCONTRACT-ORCON)

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